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Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of the activation of background knowledge during text 
comprehension. We first review the cognitive processes involved in the activation of 
inferences during text comprehension, stressing the interaction between text and reader in the 
construction of situation models. Second, we review evidence for embodied theories of 
cognition and discuss how this new framework can inform our understanding of the nature 
and role of background knowledge. We then review the neuropsychological data on the 
activation of background knowledge during text comprehension. Finally, the paper presents 
existing and future challenges in researching the role of background knowledge both at a 
conceptual and a methodological level.  
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Understanding written texts is a highly complex skill that readers often take for 
granted while performing the task. To comprehend even the simplest texts, readers must 
engage such intricate processes as feature recognition, lexical access, memory storage and 
retrieval, integration, updating, etc. What is most remarkable, and often not realized, is that 
the words on the page merely provide the scaffolding for the meaning of a text. The lion’s 
share of a text’s meaning is actually constructed by the reader. In fact, when analyzing the 
meaning units present in a text, readers usually amount to an incoherent and often 
inconsistent set of statements. Without the activation of the reader’s own background 
knowledge, almost every text would be incomprehensible. Thus, the meaning of a text is not 
comprised of the words and phrases in the text, but rather develops through an interactive 
process between the reader and the text. The current paper presents an overview on this 
particular topic of text comprehension research. 
In the following sections we review recent theoretical and empirical advances in our 
understanding of when and how background knowledge is activated during text 
comprehension. First, we review the current state of theoretical and empirical understanding 
of this topic. We explain what types of background information are activated during text 
comprehension, giving particular attention to when and how inferences are drawn. Second, we 
consider the emerging framework of embodied language comprehension and what this view 
tells us about the type of background knowledge that is activated during reading. The 
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empirical evidence for this view is reviewed and its theoretical relevance to text 
comprehension is discussed.  
Undoubtedly, the interaction between reader and text requires the study of the 
reader’s hardware. Accordingly, the next section presents new developments in the 
neuroscience of text comprehension, discussing the brain areas involved in activating 
background knowledge during text comprehension. Specifically, we consider the extent to 
which empirical research on this topic has helped to resolve controversy regarding the 
activation of background knowledge, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of current 
neuroscientific methods.  
Finally, we evaluate current and future challenges in studying the activation of 
background knowledge during text comprehension. Although valuable observations and 
predictions have surely resulted from existing paradigms, we discuss strengths and 
weaknesses of current methodological approaches, and provide suggestions for better testing 
the reader-text interaction during text comprehension. We conclude with an integrated 
discussion of current advances and future challenges in the study of background knowledge 
activation from an embodied language comprehension perspective. 
2. Background knowledge and discourse comprehension  
2.1. Mental models of text comprehension 
When comprehending a text, it is generally agreed that readers form a mental 
representation (or a mental model) of the text that is composed of different levels (Graesser, 
Singer, & Tabasso, 1994; van den Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1998). At a surface 
level, for a short period of time, the exact words and the syntax are represented; at a textbase 
level, explicit text propositions and elements needed for text cohesion are included; the final 
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level, the situation level, discussed here, includes the situation that is conveyed by the words 
and the sentences in the text (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995). This level of 
representation includes information about the people, settings, actions and events either 
described explicitly or implied by the text (Garnham & Oakhill, 1996; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998). Of special relevance is the fact that readers mentally represent information that is not 
explicitly mentioned in the text, but derived mainly from the process of inference making 
(Graesser et al., 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). 
An important aspect of inference making relates to the fact that readers combine 
different sources of information to construct a situation model (Graesser et al., 1994; van den 
Broek et al., 1998). Readers activate previously acquired knowledge that is stored in long-
term memory and combine it with information explicitly mentioned in the text (Gernsbacher, 
1997; Kintsch, 1998). Importantly, readers go beyond mere linguistic processes when 
comprehending text. For example, from the sentence “We got some beer out of the trunk. The 
beer was warm” (from Haviland & Clark, 1974), readers might infer that “it was a sunny day”. 
This inference derives from the information provided in the text as well as common 
knowledge about what happens when you leave your car in the sun. The latter information is 
not presented in the text, but combining information from the text and from previously 
acquired knowledge enables readers to form a mental model of the situation and consequently 
comprehend the text.  
A great deal of research has been directed towards investigating the generation of 
inferences at different moments in the comprehension process, mainly in the course of 
comprehending the text (i.e., while reading). Researchers have consequently differentiated off-
line and on-line inferences. Off-line inferences are those made at retrieval, i.e. subsequent to 
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reading, whereas on-line inferences are made during comprehension, i.e. while reading 
(Graesser et al., 1994). The main controversy regarding such a distinction concerns inferences 
that may or may not be generated while reading. Several theories have been advanced to 
account for research findings focused on this particular aspect of inference generation (see 
Graesser et al., 1994). Two of these theories, the constructionist approach and the minimalist 
approach, deserve further mention as they make clear and distinct predictions. 
2.2 The constructionist approach of text comprehension 
The core principle underlying the constructionist approach is one of search-after-
meaning. This principle stipulates that people naturally attempt to construct meaning from 
texts, social interactions, and perceptual input (Bartlett, 1932; as cited in Graesser et al., 
1994). The search-after-meaning process is inevitably bound to the notion of coherence. 
Readers mainly draw inferences that enable them to establish or maintain local and global 
coherence. Inferences establish or maintain local coherence through connections between 
adjacent text constituents, whereas those establishing or maintaining global coherence connect 
most constituents of a text by one or several deeper features, such as the general theme, the 
main point, or the moral of the text (Graesser et al., 1994).  
Readers abandon the search-after-meaning process under several conditions, however 
(Graesser et al., 1994). First, if readers consider the text to be completely lacking in global 
coherence, no effort is made to resolve that lack of coherence. Second, if readers do not 
possess the relevant knowledge, they are not able to resolve breaks in coherence. Finally, if 
readers’ goals do not require them to build a complex situation model, no effort is made to do 
so.  
2.3 The minimalist approach to text comprehension 
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According to this approach, if readers do not adopt a specific goal-directed strategy of 
reading, the number of inferences made while reading is limited (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). In 
situations like reading a magazine on a plane, people would more often engage in minimal 
processes. If readers’ processes are guided by specific goals (e.g., the desire to learn new 
information from the text), the minimal representation that has been automatically 
constructed enables readers to establish a more elaborate representation of the text. McKoon 
and Ratcliff (1992) claim, however, that only inferences needed for local coherence and those 
based on information that is readily available are made automatically. Readily available 
information has its roots in either long-term memory and/or in the text. According to this view, 
inferences needed for global coherence are not made while reading unless they are based on 
information that is readily available. 
2.4 Constructionist vs. Minimalist: A relevant dichotomy? 
Both the notion of readily available information and the dichotomous distinction 
between minimalist and constructivist processes are questionable for several reasons. First, it 
can be argued that in most cases, if not all, background knowledge is needed to maintain 
coherence. Indeed, it has been argued that even automatic inferences in a minimalist approach 
require constructive processes (Garnham, 1992). In the sentence “John blamed Bill because he 
spilled the milk”, the automatic referential inference predicted by the minimalist position can 
only be made using knowledge about the rather unpleasant nature of spilling milk and about 
the specific circumstances causing somebody to blame somebody else. We therefore claim 
that the important question is not whether information on which to base the inference is 
readily available, but how background knowledge and textual information may interact to 
generate (complex) inferences. This is, or should be, central to text comprehension research. 
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The following sections address this issue with two separate illustrative areas that have not 
yet received great attention: gender and emotion inferences. The first area reflects the complex 
interaction between general knowledge and textual features, whereas the second demonstrates 
that background knowledge also activates perceptual features that may subsequently be 
integrated in readers’ mental models.  
2.5 Inferences about the gender of the protagonists. 
When reading a text about a protagonist whose gender is not explicitly stated, readers 
still include the protagonist’s gender in the mental model of the situation (Carreiras, Garnham, 
Oakhill, & Cain, 1996). That is, readers infer the protagonist’s gender. For example, when 
reading the sentence “The soldiers were running through the woods”, it is very likely that 
readers form a representation that mostly includes men. Such a representation is automatic, 
and, in English, is based on stereotypical information (e.g., Garnham, Oakhill, & Reynolds, 
2002; Oakhill, Garnham, & Reynolds, 2005). In languages that are grammatically gender 
marked, such a process becomes more complicated. In French, for example, to refer to a male 
student, the grammatical masculine form is used (i.e., un étudiant) and to refer to a female 
student, the feminine form is used (i.e., une étudiante). When a group of people is referred to, 
in French, as well as in other languages such as German and Spanish, the masculine plural 
form is used (i.e., les étudiants), and is not supposed to be interpreted as masculine, but rather 
as generic, referring equally to men and women. Readers are supposed to ignore the textual 
features when forming a mental representation of gender. 
Some studies (e.g., Gygax, Gabriel, Sarrasin, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2008) have 
questioned the validity of such a generic interpretation by assessing whether in German and 
French, gender inferences are based on background knowledge, as in English, or on the 
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grammatical features (i.e., the masculine). More specifically, Gygax et al. (2008) directly 
evaluated the interaction between background knowledge and textual features. They found 
that in both French and German, when referring to a group of people, readers automatically 
build a male biased representation, independently of the stereotype portrayed by the role 
names. In French and German then, contrary to English, gender inferences are principally 
based on textual information, leaving very little influence to background knowledge. 
Gabriel and Gygax (in press) furthered this finding by investigating whether, in some 
situations, textual features could be overridden by background knowledge in constructing a 
representation of gender in grammatical gender marked languages. They focused on Norwegian, 
which, although grammatically gender marked, presents a very interesting particularity. Since 
the 1970’s, in Norwegian, the feminine form has been officially abandoned for the purpose of 
establishing a true gender-neutralized masculine form (Norsk Språkråd, 1997). To refer to a 
group of people, even if exclusively constituted of women, the masculine form is used. 
Gabriel and Gygax (in press) demonstrated that such a policy had only partly diminished the 
impact of the grammatical mark of gender. Indeed, although stereotypical information was 
influential in the construction of gender representation for male and female stereotyped role 
names, a textual feature (i.e., the masculine) was predominant for the construction of a gender 
representation of neutrally stereotyped role names (e.g., musicians).  
In all, these results have two important implications. First, even when gender is not 
explicit in the text, a representation of gender is constructed while reading. Second, such a 
representation is either based on textual information or on stereotypical information 
depending on the grammatical properties of the role names and the social policies regarding 
language use. When no specific policies have been implemented and grammatical marking is 
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present, it is based on textual information, as in French and German. When there are no 
textual features, it is based on stereotypical information, as in English. When specific language 
policies have been implemented, as in Norwegian, both stereotypical information and textual 
features are influential, showing an interesting interaction. Most importantly, and as stressed 
by Gabriel, Gygax, Sarrasin, Garnham, and Oakhill (2008), the influence of textual features in 
the construction of a representation of gender can never really disappear.  
Although these aforementioned studies demonstrated that stereotypicality had little 
influence on the representation of gender when grammatical features were present, Schneider, 
Gygax, Wagner-Egger, Parris & Kuhn (2008) further investigated stereotypical influences 
using a somehow different approach. Based on the notion of embodied cognition, which will 
be more thoroughly addressed later in this paper, they investigated whether visual-spatial 
representations would influence the construction of a mental representation of gender. 
Participants were presented with role names, in the masculine form (Experiment 1) or in both 
the masculine and feminine forms (Experiment 2), above or below a fixation point on the 
screen, and were asked to determine whether those role names were most likely occupied by 
men or women. Based on the idea that power is spatially represented (Schubert, 2005) and 
that there are clear indications, in a discriminatory fashion, that women are considered by 
some as less powerful (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006), Schneider et al. hypothesised that 
participants, especially those holding sexist beliefs, would respond with men more often and 
faster when role names were presented above the fixation point, and with women more often 
and faster when the role names were presented below the fixation point. Although the results 
did not show the expected visual-spatial effect associated to gender, participants were still 
faster to respond men when a stereotypical male role name of high status (e.g., surgeon) was 
presented above the fixation point then below it, and vice versa for low status stereotypical 
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male role names (e.g., technician). There were also clear signs that participants responded 
more often women when the role names were considered of low status, and more often men 
when role names were considered of high status, but this was independent of their spatial 
position. The interpretation of these latter results goes beyond the scope of this paper, but 
importantly, there was initial evidence of a spatial representation of male stereotypical role 
names, depending of the status of the role name.  
In summary, the construction of a representation of gender is an interesting case, as it 
provides a genuine basis for the study of the interaction of textual features and background 
knowledge in inferential processesi. It is also interesting in terms of social representations and 
their impact upon the (perceptual) nature of the content of mental models. We next present 
the case of a different type of inference, which also stresses the perceptual nature of mental 
models. 
2.6 Inferences about the main protagonist’s emotional status. 
Early work on emotion inferences suggested that when reading narrative texts about a 
main protagonist in a situation eliciting an emotional reaction, readers infer the main 
protagonist’s emotional state automatically and explicitly (e.g., Gernsbacher, Goldsmith & 
Robertson, 1992). When reading a story about a protagonist who lost his job, readers activate 
background knowledge about what happens when someone loses his or her job, and include 
the information as specific as sad in their mental model of the situation. Such specificity of 
inference has been further supported by other research on emotion inferences (e.g., de Vega, 
Díaz, & León, 1997; Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998) and also by research on 
characters’ trait inferences (Rapp, Gerrig, & Prentice, 2001), which indicates that readers 
form a rather specific trait-based model of narrative protagonists.  
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Some authors (Gygax, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2004; Gygax, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2003) 
have questioned such a notion of specificity, suggesting that when reading a text, there is no 
need for the readers to activate complex background information and incorporate specific 
emotions in their mental representations, and that a more superficial, and perhaps more 
concrete representation of emotion will suffice to guide the reading process. Gygax et al. 
(2008) further this idea by showing that under normal reading circumstances, readers include 
behavioral elements that are perhaps more simple to retrieve from background knowledge and 
more easily shared by different modes of representation, in their mental model of the situation 
(e.g., cry, clench your fist). They argued that such information could still be interpreted as 
part of an emotion construct.  
Put differently, Gygax and colleagues wanted to show that under normal reading 
circumstances, readers do not need a deep, complex representation of rather abstract emotions 
to comprehend the text. Readers simply activate more concrete information to be 
incorporated in their mental representation of the text. This information forms the basis for 
more complex and elaborate emotional inferences. In a sense, readers activate some elements 
pertaining to the main character’s emotional status, and such information forms what can be 
defined as a shallow or underspecified representation of emotions. This parallels the growing 
idea found in research on text comprehension that underspecified representations of text are 
often perfectly acceptable (e.g., Sanford & Graesser, 2006), and good enough representations 
(Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) help to economize the comprehension process.  
It may be the case that readers’ easily-activated background knowledge on emotions is 
mostly composed of physical elements, or elements pertaining to movement. Lamontagne-
Mueller, Gygax, Hauert, and Seiler (2007) found some supporting evidence for this 
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explanation by showing that readers activate some perceptual or visual-spatial traces of the 
character’s body posture/movement when reading emotion situations. In the same line of 
thinking, others have demonstrated that the construction of a situation model incorporating 
predictive inferences was disrupted by a concurrent visual-spatial memory task (Fincher-
Kiefer & D’Agostino, 2004). This clearly shows that situation models are not amodal, 
incorporating verbal as well as perceptual information. 
2.7 Concluding comments 
Reading processes appear to be driven by readers’ general need to establish and 
maintain a certain understanding of the text. Readers build a mental representation of the text 
based on inferences that contribute to text coherence by identifying the connections among 
ideas, and inferences that call for the use of background knowledge (see Singer & Remillard, 
2004; Schmalhofer, McDaniel, & Keefe, 2002).  The nature of such an interaction has proven 
to be a true challenge for text comprehension researchers, as (1) the interaction between the 
two sources is complex and varies from situation to situation, and (2) the background 
knowledge that is activated can be underspecified and multimodal in nature. Emotion and 
gender inferences are typical cases that reflect these issues, which will be further discussed in 
the following section.   
3. Embodied Text Comprehension 
In recent decades, the field of cognitive psychology has seen a shift away from 
symbolic, amodal cognitive systems and towards embodied theories of cognition. While 
traditional views (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1986) assumed a conceptual system that 
processed symbolic units that were arbitrarily related to their referents (the word dog does 
not look, sound, smell, taste, or feel like an actual dog), embodied theories have pushed to 
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explicitly integrate the body and its perceptual-motor systems into conceptual models. 
According to this new embodied framework, language and conceptual representations are 
instantiated in the same systems that are used for perception and action. This means that 
when comprehenders process language, they partially reactivate previous traces of experience 
that are distributed across multiple perceptual and motor modalities in the brain. 
This recent embodied framework of language comprehension can therefore help to 
better articulate our understanding of the type of background knowledge that is activated 
during text comprehension. Because the embodied framework predicts that perceptual-motor 
representations are routinely activated during language comprehension, reading a text should 
activate information about how the described characters, things, and places should look, 
sound, smell, and feel (in both the emotional and tactile senses). According to this framework, 
even potential motor responses to described situations are activated. The evidence for these 
claims is reviewed below.  
Perceptual-motor representations in language comprehension are conceptualized as 
activations of experiential simulations of a described situation (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan & 
Madden, 2005). There is a growing body of evidence that the representations underlying 
language comprehension are grounded in our perceptual and motor systems (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2003; Kaschak et al., 2005; Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Doherty, 
1989; Madden & Zwaan, 2006; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001; Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & 
Aveyard, 2004; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Although both 
systems are most often incorporated in a given representation, these systems are often 
studied separately, and as such, demonstrations that language comprehension evokes 
IN PRESS, PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 16 
perceptual representations of the described situation will be considered first, and evidence for 
the activation of motor representations during language comprehension will be discussed 
thereafter. Finally, supporting evidence from imaging studies is mentioned before turning to 
the implications of the embodied framework of language comprehension on the activation of 
background knowledge during text comprehension. 
3.1. Perceptual Representations 
A study by Zwaan & colleagues (Zwaan et al., 2002) has shown that comprehenders 
routinely activate perceptual representations of objects described in short sentences. In this 
study, participants heard a sentence describing an object in a particular location, such as “In 
the sky there was an eagle,” and were asked to decide whether or not a subsequently pictured 
object was mentioned in that sentence. On experimental trials, the subsequently pictured 
object was always the object mentioned in the sentence, requiring a ‘yes’ response. However, 
the shape of the pictured object could either match or mismatch the contextual constraints of 
the preceding sentence. For example, in the sentence, “There was spaghetti in the pot”, a 
picture of cooked spaghetti would be a matching picture, whereas a picture of uncooked 
spaghetti would be a mismatching picture. Responses were faster for pictures that 
perceptually matched rather than mismatched the contextual constraints of the sentence, 
providing support for the idea that perceptual information is incorporated in language 
representations. Even when participants did not have to respond as to whether the pictured 
object was mentioned in the sentence, but rather simply name the pictured object, pictures 
that perceptually matched rather than mismatched the contextual constraints of the sentence 
yielded faster naming responses. This effect has been shown across age groups as well as 
across skill levels (Madden & Zwaan, 2006). Furthermore, similar studies have also 
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demonstrated that comprehenders routinely represent other perceptual aspects of described 
entities, such as the direction of motion of objects (Zwaan et al., 2004) and the orientation of 
objects (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001).  
In addition, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003) have demonstrated that 
perceptual representations underlie conceptual language comprehension. In their study, 
switching from one modality to another incurred a switching cost, just as has been shown in 
perceptual processing tasks. Participants were faster to verify properties of concepts in a 
given perceptual modality if it was preceded by a trial in which the same perceptual modality 
was verified. For example, participants were faster to verify BLENDER-loud (auditory 
modality) if it was preceded by LEAVES-rustling (auditory modality) rather than 
CRANBERRIES-tart (taste modality). Only words were presented in the experiment, and 
participants were not instructed to engage in imagery. This study demonstrates how language 
comprehension is grounded in the perceptual processing system, and thus exhibits the same 
limitations and sensory-motor phenomena that have been shown for purely perceptual tasks. 
3.2. Motor Representations 
In addition to the evidence for perceptual representations, language comprehension 
has also been shown to engage motor representations. For instance, a study by Klatzky and 
colleagues (1989) demonstrated that motor patterns can facilitate the comprehension of 
language. Participants were faster to read and comprehend a sentence about throwing darts 
when they were first instructed to form their hand into the pinched fingers (dart-throwing) 
position. Activating the motor program for dart throwing serves to grease the wheels for 
conceptual processing of a sentence about throwing darts. For the motor pattern to be able to 
facilitate language comprehension, the two must be represented in the same system.  
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More recently, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) have reported a related phenomenon 
called the action-sentence compatibility effect. In this study, participants were faster to make 
responses in the same direction as the actions described in sentences. For instance, 
participants were faster to move their finger from one button to another father away from the 
body when sentences implied motion away from the body (“close the drawer”). This effect is 
consistent with language comprehension that is embodied, or grounded in action. The action 
sequences described in the sentences activate motor representations, and therefore are 
susceptible to interference from motor programs in the sensorimotor cortex. Furthermore, 
Zwaan and Taylor (2006, Experiment 4) have shown that the activation of motor 
representations during the comprehension of action sentences is rather immediate as it occurs 
during processing of the verb describing the action in question. 
3.3 Imaging Evidence 
Research from brain-imaging studies also provides support for the embodied view of 
narrative comprehension. When action words and sentences are comprehended, motor regions 
of the brain are active (Hauk et al., 2004). Also, animal words have been shown to produce 
activation in the visual cortex, as animals are often viewed, while tool words have been shown 
to produce activation in the premotor cortex, as tools are often manually manipulated. 
Furthermore, reading threatening words has been shown to activate the amygdale, the brain 
region associated with processing human emotions, such as fear. Findings such as these 
suggest that modality specific representations are activated during narrative comprehension. 
3.4. Implication of an embodied view on text comprehension 
Research on embodied language comprehension demonstrates that reading words and 
sentences activates perceptual-motor representations in the same systems that process 
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perception and action. This emerging framework proposes that the various types of 
inferences can be re-defined in terms of perceptual and motor simulations. This recent 
embodied framework of language comprehension can therefore help to better articulate our 
understanding of the type of background knowledge that is activated during text 
comprehension. When we simulate described situations, we activate supplementary 
information, such as affordances, emotional responses, and typical situational constrains 
(agents, patients, locations, objects, actions) that all aid in the comprehension process. 
As mentioned before, comprehending a text involves a dynamic interaction between 
text and reader. Thus, the type of background knowledge that is activated varies, depending 
on the individual who is reading. Accordingly, the embodied framework predicts that the same 
text would yield different simulations for different people, based on their experiences with the 
described entities and events. For instance, a simulation of "the top of the refrigerator" for a 
very tall person would likely include a view of the upper surface of the refrigerator and any 
dust or whatnot that is on it, whereas the same simulation for a short person would probably 
not include a view of the top surface of the refrigerator. The stronger prediction follows that 
if representations are reactivations of perceptual-motor experience, then a person can only 
represent that which he or she has already experienced, or combinations thereof. While 
combinations of previous experiences afford ample representational possibilities, this does 
constitute certain limitations (e.g., infinite time/space, multidimensionality). 
It should be noted that a simulation activated through reading a text is presumably 
much less complete than actual perception or action experiences, as it only partially 
reactivates memory traces of perceptual and motor experience. Thus, the resulting 
representations are not as perceptually specified and vivid as actual experience. This idea is 
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consistent with the idea of underspecified representations of text mentioned in the previous 
section on inferences (e.g. Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002). 
Although the activation of perceptual-motor representations is partial or schematic in 
comparison to actual experience, it is nonetheless instantiated in the same systems as those 
used for perception and action. Therefore, it serves as a mechanism for grounding the 
background knowledge that is activated during language comprehension in our bodily 
experience. This has been demonstrated through behavioral experiments on perceptual 
representations and motor representations, but also through imaging the activity of brain areas 
responsible for these representations. The following section will provide a more specific 
understanding of the various brain areas involved in the activation of background knowledge 
during text comprehension. 
4. Neuroimaging studies of text comprehension 
Recent development in the study of text comprehension has been characterized by the 
use of brain-activation measures such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
positron emissions tomography (PET). These types of neuroimaging techniques have enabled 
us to identify changes in neural activity in particular brain regions by measuring blood flow 
variations during text comprehension (Bookheimer, 2002; Ferstl, 2007; Gernsbacher & 
Kaschak, 2003; Mar, 2004). The fMRI methodology is a non-invasive technique that uses 
nuclear magnetic resonance to render images of the brain’s blood flow during the processing 
of particular stimuli, whereas the PET technique is an invasive method in which a radioactive 
material is injected into the blood stream and later detected by an X-ray yielding a 3-D image. 
Both techniques capitalize on the fact that active areas of the brain recruit a higher level of 
blood flow.  Although different designs can be used, most experiments are based on a 
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subtraction approach in which the brain activations elicited by two more or less similar tasks 
are directly compared. 
Ferstl, Rinck and von Cramon (2005), for example, used event related fMRI to map 
the neural correlates of text comprehension processes in different contexts. They compared 
the comprehension of stories which contained inconsistencies in chronological or emotional 
information with consistent versions of the same stories to study the effects of processing 
inconsistent information. The researchers observed activation in the left precuneus and a 
bilateral frontoparietal network for chronological consistent information whereas consistent 
emotional information revealed activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the 
extended amygdaloid complex. The integration of inconsistent chronological information 
engaged the lateral prefrontal cortex bilaterally, whereas the integration of inconsistent 
emotional information required the dorsal frontomedial cortex. The authors concluded that 
updating the situation model was not a unitary process but rather depended on the specific 
requirements of the text. These results, especially those regarding the activation of emotion 
centers, are particularly relevant to the activation of background knowledge during language 
comprehension. Most importantly, those activated brain regions have been known to be 
activated during emotion experience (see Buchanan, 2007), suggesting a simulation process as 
predicted by the embodied cognition framework. 
Neuroimaging studies such as this one show that several brain regions are essential to 
the activation of background knowledge. In the following sections, the contributions of these 
brain regions are discussed. First, the evidence on the right hemisphere during comprehension 
is reported. Secondly, the crucial role of executive functions is evaluated by analyzing the 
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lateral prefrontal cortex. Finally, the roles of the anterior temporal lobe and of the fronto-
medial cortex, specific to text comprehension in an inconsistent context, are also discussed. 
4.1 The role of the right hemisphere in text comprehension 
Although the right hemisphere is known to be involved during text comprehension, its 
role is still unclear (Mar, 2004; Ferstl, 2007). Several studies have shown a contribution of the 
right hemisphere in activating certain inferences and predictability in specific contexts 
(Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000; Ferstl et al., 2005; Long & Baynes, 2002; Mason & 
Just, 2004; Nichelli et al., 1995; Roberston et al., 2000; St. George, Kutas, Martinez, & 
Sereno, 1999; Virtue, Haberman, Clancy, Parrish, & Beeman, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001). For 
example, St. George et al. (1999) showed that right hemisphere activation was stronger for 
untitled than titled stories in their fMRI study. However, other studies have mainly reported 
left-dominant activation (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2001; Fletcher et al., 1995; Maguire, Frith, & 
Morris, 1999; Virtue et al., 2006). Some have suggested (e.g. Mason & Just, 2004) that while 
the right hemisphere appears to be involved in activating certain inferences, the left 
hemisphere may be involved in selecting and integrating these inferences into the discourse 
structure.  
From these studies it can be gleaned that both the left and the right hemisphere are 
necessary for the elaboration of meaning from linguistic input. This indicates that there should 
be a bilateral semantic processing in order to process complex linguistic units (see Virtue et al., 
2006). The extraction of meaning from texts requires from readers the use of their background 
knowledge to draw pertinent inferences and activate adequate memory codes for the 
situations referred to in the texts. However, whereas the left hemisphere seems to deal with 
semantic concepts closely linked to the input, the right hemisphere focuses on broader 
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semantic concepts that are implied by and related distantly to the linguistic input. This 
functioning of the right hemisphere has been termed the Coarse Semantic Coding (Beeman, 
1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005). The relevance of this hypothesis for the use of background 
knowledge lies in the fact that whereas specific knowledge seems to be activated by the left 
hemisphere, knowledge about related categories and concepts in a coarser interpretation of 
language seem to be done within the right hemisphere. 
4.2  The role of lateral prefrontal cortex in text comprehension 
Neuroimaging studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex seems to be important for the 
activation of background knowledge during text comprehension. Whereas Broca’s area, within 
the inferior prefrontal cortex, is involved during phonological and syntactic processes at the 
sentence level (see Bookheimer, 2002), deeper text comprehension processes activate the 
frontal lobe region, the center of different executive functions such as inhibition, monitoring, 
or sequencing (Crozier et al., 1999; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2001; Grafman, 2002; Roberston et 
al., 2000). Cognitive models of text comprehension also locate encoding, retrieval, and 
integration processes in the prefrontal cortex, more specifically in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Grafman (2002) proposed that the prefrontal cortex is responsible for the processing 
of structured and sequential events that are goal oriented and schematic. More specifically, 
the functions attributed to more specific areas of the prefrontal cortex, such as processing 
social event sequences (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) and predictable event sequences 
(medial prefrontal cortex) appear relevant for text comprehension, especially the 
comprehension of narrative events. However, the exact function of these regions is not yet 
known (see Ferstl, 2007; Zalla, Phipps, & Grafman, 2002). In addition, the comprehension of 
texts involves strategic memory retrieval processes, including the monitoring and 
IN PRESS, PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 24 
manipulation of the contents of working memory (middorsolateral frontal cortex), as well as 
the maintenance of cues for long-term memory retrieval and encoding (ventrolateral frontal 
cortex), and the processes of rejecting or accepting the products of memory retrieval (the 
prefrontal cortex).  
Other studies (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002; Ferstl et al., 2005; Frith & Frith, 2001; 
Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001) have related the dorso-medial 
prefrontal cortex to theory of mind processes.  These refer to the ability to attribute people’s 
actions to their beliefs, motivations and goals. For example, Fletcher et al., (1995) collected 
PET data asking participants to read stories requiring the attribution of mental states to 
characters and showed that comprehending narrative events involved the inclusion of the 
protagonists’ states of mind, including their goals and emotions (Mar, 2004; van den Broek, 
1994), in their mental representations while reading. Thus, the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex 
plays an important role in the activation of background knowledge during reading. 
4.3 The role of the anterior temporal lobe and of the fronto-medial cortex in text 
comprehension 
Several studies have shown that the anterior temporal lobes are activated during the 
integration of incoming words into an existing semantic representation. More precisely, the 
local detection of inconsistencies has been found to be related to the activation of a right 
anterior temporal region (Beeman, 1993, 1998; Roberston et al, 2000; St. George et al., 1999) 
and posterior temporal areas (Kircher, Brammer, Andreu, Williams, & McGuire, 2001; St. 
George et al., 1999; Schmithorst, Holland, & Plante, 2006). However, Humphries, Willard, 
Buchsbaum, and Hickok, (2001) have shown evidence of activation of the left anterior 
temporal lobe while processing events in the auditory modality.  
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Various processes associated with text comprehension, such as semantic, executive, 
phonological, and affective processes, have been shown to be vulnerable to selective 
impairment. For instance, patients with dysexecutive functioning associated with prefrontal 
cortical damage fail to understand texts cohesively (Ferstl, Guthke, & von Cramon, 1999; Mar, 
2004; Troiani, Ash, Reilly, & Grossman, 2006). Zalla et al. (2002) showed that patients with 
prefrontal lesions had problems with both on-line inference processes and with extracting the 
sequential order of story events. Research on lesion patients also confirmed the participation 
of the frontal lobes and right hemisphere areas in sequencing events during text 
comprehension. 
4.4. Strengths and weaknesses in neuropsychological methods 
Whereas the high spatial resolution of fMRI and PET has been extremely useful with 
respect to localizing the specific brain areas that contribute to language comprehension, they 
are not without their limitations. These techniques rely on levels of recruited blood flow, and 
thus are only indirect measures of neural activity. The temporal resolution of these measures 
is rather low, as blood is only recruited into brain areas after that area has become active and 
used up existing supplies. Likewise, in addition to the high level of invasiveness, the 
temporal resolution of the PET methodology is further constrained as the radioactive agent 
decays rapidly, and tasks that require more time and elaboration, such as text comprehension, 
become difficult to monitor. In light of these temporal limitations, it is important to 
supplement fMRI and PET findings with other techniques, such as electroencephalogram 
recordings and transcranial magnetic stimulation. 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) recording is a non-invasive technique to record brain 
electrical impulses by means of several electrodes which are placed on the scalp. Time-
locking this electrical recording to a specific stimulus event yields an event-related potential 
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(ERP), which has been especially informative for language research. A particular strength of 
this methodology is its highly accurate temporal resolution, indeed better than fMRI and PET. 
However, the spatial resolution of EEG recordings is poor in comparison to those of fMRI 
and PET.  Thus, EEG recordings can be combined with imaging data to obtain high spatio-
temporal assessments of brain activity during text comprehension (see Hagoort, Hald, 
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004). Likewise, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is 
another measure that offers high temporal resolution. TMS a non-invasive method to 
stimulate neuronal groups in the brain by using a wire coil placed close the head that releases 
weak electromagnetic currents. Finally, the emerging methodology of 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) is a fairly recent advancement in the study of language 
processing. This technique measures the magnetic fields produced by electrical activity in the 
brain using extremely sensitive magnetometers that can pick up small magnetic fields. Both 
the temporal and spatial resolutions of MEG are better than those yielded by fMRI and EEG 
(see Baillet, Mosher, & Leahy, 2001). Given MEG’s advantages, it presents a very promising 
means to identify the brain areas activated when embodied background knowledge is used 
during text comprehension.  
4.5. Concluding comments 
This section presents neuroscientific evidence supporting the idea that text 
comprehension requires the activation of background knowledge. In particular, this section 
highlights how different brain areas are activated immediately and in a distributed network so 
that memory, inferences, and mental simulations can be performed during the comprehension 
process. Neuroscience methodologies, with all of their strengths and weaknesses, have 
revealed much about the activation of background knowledge during text comprehension and 
the underlying brain areas implicated in this process. However, despite the significant 
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progress that has been made in this realm, fully understanding the relative neural contributions 
of components of the extended language network remains one of the clear challenges for future 
research. The following section addresses further challenges that lie ahead for the study of text 
comprehension. 
5. Methodological and conceptual challenges 
The study of text comprehension has employed various methodologies to reveal the 
cognitive processes and the neural systems that underlie language comprehension. The 
following section discusses important limitations and conceptual challenges to current 
approaches, as well as potential avenues for future research. First current strengths and 
limitations of behavioral methods in understanding the role of background knowledge during 
language comprehension will be discussed. Next, the possible benefits of a more naturalistic 
approach to understanding how background knowledge can be used to enhance 
comprehension are addressed, followed by the educational implications of this type of 
approach. Finally, existing and future challenges to the embodied language comprehension 
framework are considered. 
5.1 Behavioral methods 
In language research, behavioral experiments have been the primary tool in 
understanding how people process sentences and texts. Because offline methods tap readers' 
situation model after reading, these measures have been particularly useful in understanding 
the contents and nature of the situation model that has been constructed upon reading. In 
these types of tasks, researchers measure reading times of whole sentences or texts, responses 
to probe words, pictures, or questions, recall accuracy and content of stories, text summaries, 
and responses to questionnaires, to name a few. While offline methods have provided 
invaluable information about the comprehension process, it is becoming increasingly 
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important to investigate online processes to gain a better understanding of exactly how the 
situation model is constructed step by step. Online measures, such as eyetracking, word by 
word reading time measures, within-sentence probe designs, and concurrent interference tasks, 
tap the ongoing comprehension process, rather than the end product of this process. 
Research from the embodied framework has been particularly fruitful in providing new 
online methods and improved tools to investigate the activation of embodied background 
knowledge. For example, researchers have employed visual adaptation tasks (Glenberg, 
Harnad, Goldstone, Wiemer-Hastings, & Zwaan, 2005), visual and manual rotation tasks 
(Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), perceptual motion interference tasks (Kaschak et al. 2005) and the 
marble moving task (Casasanto & Lozano, 2007), to mention just a few. Many of these tasks 
are designed to test the interference or facilitation of concurrent perceptual-motor stimuli on 
language comprehension. For example, Casasanto and Lozano (2007) investigated whether 
ongoing motor actions affected the spatial content of literal or metaphorical stories 
(Experiment 1). Participants were asked to tell stories while moving marbles from one box to 
another repeatedly in a specified direction (i.e., upward, downward, leftward, and rightward). 
The researchers found that marble movements, although irrelevant to storytelling, did 
influence participants' verbal fluency. Movement direction (e.g., upwards) that were 
congruent with the spatial schema implied by the story (e.g., literal: my rocket went higher, 
metaphorical: my grades went higher) increased participants' verbal fluency. Likewise, a 
deficit was observed when the movement direction mismatched the direction implied in the 
story. These results suggest that not only concrete concepts, but also metaphorical concepts 
are tied to perceptual-motor representations. This avenue of research on abstract concepts 
will be further discussed in the section on challenges to the embodied view. 
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Another particularly useful tool in online language comprehension research is the 
eyetracking methodology, in which eye movements are monitored as participants view 
linguistic or pictorial stimuli. The position of the eyes can be a revealing window into what 
information is currently being processed. For instance, Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip, 
and Carlson (2002) monitored participants eye movements while they followed instructions 
(Put the cube inside the can) to manipulate real objects in a workspace. The researchers found 
that visual attention was limited to objects that afforded the constraints of the instruction 
(containers) and furthermore, to objects that afforded the constraints of the physical situation 
(containers that are large enough). This suggests that the comprehension system rapidly 
integrates linguistic information with situation-specific constraints and background knowledge 
about affordances. This type of background knowledge taps our physical experiences and is 
consistent with the idea of perceptual-motor representation during language comprehension. 
5.2 A naturalistic language approach 
The study described above is rare in its use of a rather naturalistic task. Although 
following directions to manipulate objects in an experimental workspace is not something we 
do every day, the design nonetheless represents an attempt to bring language research into a 
more real-world domain of listening and acting. This raises the issue of ecological validity in 
language comprehension research, which is a general criticism of many studies. Indeed, many 
studies, and especially studies in the embodied language comprehension framework, employ 
single words or sentences as experimental stimuli, which is not at all how language is 
experienced in the real world. A future challenge for the embodied language comprehension 
framework lies in expanding experimental stimuli to include larger texts and discourse, while 
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maintaining the experimental control and precision that are required to test the specific 
mechanisms of language comprehension. 
In moving away from single word experiments, one immediately faces the issue of 
word combinations in the activation of background knowledge. For instance, even when 
stimuli are restricted to noun-verb combinations, it already becomes difficult to discern 
whether certain types of background knowledge are activated by the noun, the verb, or a 
combination of the two. While verbs alone have been shown to activate much information 
concerning typical agents, patients, and instruments/tools (Ferretti, McRae, & Hatherell, 
2001), combinations of verbs and nouns (girl-ride vs. man-ride) have been shown to produce 
different activations of background knowledge (carousel vs. motorcycle) which are clearly due 
to the word combinations rather than the individual words themselves (Kamide, Altmann & 
Haywood, 2003). Even small inflections of a given verb in verb-noun combinations (served 
customer vs. serving customer) can produce different interpretations based on background 
knowledge about typical agents and patients in events (Ferretti, Gagné, & McRae, 2003). 
This interaction between words presents an interesting avenue of research, yet also a 
challenge for embodied research, and one that becomes even more interesting and challenging 
when larger texts are considered. Although single word and single sentence experiments 
continue to be invaluable to the field of research, it is equally important to extend research 
designs to include larger texts for reasons of external validity. 
Even when larger texts are used, however, a core criticism is that the texts used are 
generally “textoids”, or texts created by the investigators and modified to control experimental 
variables that fit the research questions. Textoids do not capture the complexity of literary 
texts like tales and novels (Lorch & van den Broek, 1997; van den Broek, Rohleder & Narváez, 
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1994). Also, conceptually speaking, the language that currently explains text comprehension 
is strongly biased by cognitive theories that pay relatively little attention to advances in 
literary studies and narratology. Consequently, a more accurate understanding of narrative 
texts themselves is a task that seems to warrant attention.  
As an alternative to textoids, many researchers stress the importance of using more 
“natural” texts and reading situations in the study of text comprehension. These ideas have 
emerged through the support of psychological models conceptualizing narratology, literary 
theories, and semiotics (Segal, 1995; Short, 2001), as well as research proposals that try to 
capture psychological activity in everyday contexts. Such proposals have contributed to a 
more situated methodology for studying the comprehension of narrative texts. For example, 
González (2005) utilized observation and interview techniques to identify the way in which 
teachers lead a group of children towards the implicit information in texts and the formulation 
of inferences. 
In addition, theories in social psychology account for the relationship between social 
cognition and narrative texts (e.g., Donahue & Foster, 2004; Emmott, 2003) and the social 
factors linked to language usage in everyday situations (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). These theoretical contributions have led to the 
design of studies in which the influence of social variables on narrative comprehension can be 
measured (Kennan et al., 1990; Lorch & van den Broek, 1997; Magliano, 1999). For example, 
Magliano (1999) used verbal protocols (thinking aloud) and question-answering techniques to 
understand how readers elaborate inferences during text comprehension, a necessary cognitive 
process to connect background knowledge to the linguistic input. In these investigations, 
researchers use original narrative texts (i.e., naturalistic texts), which are the same sort of texts 
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people read in everyday contexts. These types of methodological approaches that more 
closely resemble real reading situations pave the way for investigating the comprehension of 
texts in more applied settings, such as educational environments. 
5.3. Educational implications 
The psychological study of text comprehension contributes to the development of 
methodologies that promote the utilization of background knowledge during narrative text 
analysis in educational settings (Arroyave, Jiménez, Londoño, & Marmolejo-Ramos, 2004; 
Marmolejo-Ramos, 2004). Principally, it is argued that through the use of narrative texts in 
educational settings, high-level cognitive operations can be bootstrapped, and more situated 
psychopedagogical interventions can be modeled. This highlights important implications with 
respect to the emerging view of embodied language comprehension. Specifically, the use of 
experience-based knowledge, mainly sensoriomotor knowledge, can promote the 
comprehension of events (Marmolejo-Ramos, 2007). For instance, classic experiments carried 
out by the Genovese School (Sinclair et al., 1985/1976; Sinclair & Bronckart, 1972) 
demonstrated that children comprehended and produced short sentences with greater ease 
when they were permitted to manipulate toys representing the actions embedded in the 
sentences. 
More recently, Glenberg and colleagues (Glenberg, Brown, & Levin, 2007; Glenberg, 
Gutiérrez, Levin, Japuntich, & Kaschak, 2004) extended the Genovese results by using texts 
instead of short sentences. In one of their experiments a group of young readers was asked to 
manipulate objects to enact the actions and characters referred to in a text, whereas another 
group was asked to re-read the text without manipulating the objects. Researchers found that 
the manipulation group performed better in a comprehension task where memory and 
IN PRESS, PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 33 
inferences for the text were measured (Glenberg et al., 2007). These results support the idea 
that the active use of embodied background knowledge facilitates comprehension. This idea is 
also consistent with results of Gentaz and colleagues (e.g., Bara, Gentaz, Colé, & Sprenger-
Charolles, 2004) on young children's ability to learn about letters and shapes. Gentaz and 
colleagues have observed that children are better able to learn about letters and shapes when 
they have perceptual-motor experience of touching and drawing these letters and shapes. This 
constitutes yet another demonstration that meaning is better grasped when the situation 
referred to is grounded in the readers' sensory-motor experience with the world. 
5.4. Challenges to the embodied view 
The embodied language comprehension framework is not without its critics. Indeed, 
some researchers posit that much of the empirical evidence supporting the embodied view 
can likewise be explained through amodal representations. However, it is often the case that 
embodied theories predict these empirical results whereas amodal theories can only explain 
them post hoc. In addition, some critics argue that embodied theories lack a precise 
explanation of the processes mediating language input and the activation of sensorimotor 
areas. Although the role of sensory-motor representations in the narrative comprehension 
process is not fully understood, progress is being made on this front (for a review see Fischer 
& Zwaan, 2008). For instance, Madden & Zwaan (2006) have shown how sensory-motor 
representations can act as a mechanism for construing the contextually appropriate meaning 
or sense of a word during language comprehension. Likewise, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) have 
helped to delineate the timeline of activation of sensory-motor representations. Although 
research is underway in this area, it is clear that there is still much to be explained. 
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) argue that the lack of precision in defining the 
mechanisms underlying sensorimotor activation leaves open the possibility that modal 
representations could mediate the interaction between linguistic information and 
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sensorimotor activation. Indeed, it would be difficult for embodied theories to demonstrate 
that amodal representations are not being activated during language comprehension. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of an amodal processing system does not undermine the 
embodied view; on the contrary, it may offer additional explanatory value that invites further 
investigation. It may be the case that the embodied system has older roots in the evolution of 
human cognition, and amodal symbol processing evolved at a later stage to further aid 
cognition and communication. 
A further criticism of the embodied language comprehension framework is that it 
remains unclear how the working definition of embodied language comprehension presented 
thus far applies to abstract entities. A potential response to this criticism lies in metaphorical 
representation, in which case abstract concepts can be understood through a mapping onto 
more concrete concepts (e.g., Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980). Indeed, when people are asked to 
generate features for abstract concepts, they tend to relate abstract concepts to other concepts 
that are more perceptual in nature (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). In addition, there is recent 
empirical evidence demonstrating that specific body actions enhance people comprehension 
of metaphors (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). That is, the metaphorical phrase “push the argument” 
is comprehended faster when people perform a push movement previous to read the phrase 
than when they perform a mismatching body movement or simply do not perform any 
movement. Although the metaphorical language of interest is often reduced to phrases that 
can be explicitly linked to perceptual and motor referents, this line of research presents a first 
step at addressing the problem of abstract representations within the embodied language 
comprehension framework. 
Another approach suggests that abstract event descriptions may be understood in 
terms of more concrete physical events, without reference to metaphor. Talmy’s (1988) 
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theory of force dynamics explains that we understand not only concrete events (The 
bulldozer pushed the dirt across the lot) but also abstract events (Jenny convinced her 
husband to confess) by representing their underlying patterns of physical forces (e.g., causing 
action, allowing rest) and relating them to our own physical and psychosocial experiences. In 
line with this theory, Madden and Pecher (2007) have demonstrated that abstract sentences 
are comprehended faster when they were preceded by concrete sentences or event animations 
of the same rather than different underlying force patterns, even though the abstract sentences 
had nothing else in common with the preceding sentence or animation. This provides a 
possible mechanism by which abstract events may be understood, namely in terms of the 
physical and psychosocial forces underlying the events. This view of grounding abstract 
concepts in more concrete and physical principles that are easier to understand is consistent 
with the research described earlier by Gygax and colleagues. These researchers demonstrated 
that emotional inferences often include concrete behavioral elements (e.g., cry, clench your 
fist) instead of more abstract emotional information, suggesting that comprehension of such 
complex emotional information is often reduced to what it feels like in the body to be angry, 
surprised, relieved, etc. This line of research provides yet another avenue to explore in 
representing abstract concepts within the embodied framework. 
5.5. Concluding comments 
The current section describes how current methodologies in the study of text 
comprehension have yielded many insights into how background knowledge is activated and 
used during language comprehension. However, new research questions are continually arising 
that require innovative methodological approaches, especially online measures of language 
comprehension. At the same time, researchers must strive to incorporate naturalistic 
IN PRESS, PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 36 
approaches to the study of text comprehension into their studies. Meeting these research 
demands brings the promise of greater success in educational environments and other applied 
settings. Finally, several important criticisms of the embodied language comprehension 
framework were raised, but not without offering potential avenues of research to respond to 
these criticisms. 
6. Conclusion 
About forty years ago, linguists believed that readers constructed mental 
representations of a text that encompassed its exact words. Evidently, and as discussed at 
length in this paper, the role of background knowledge was clearly underestimated in the 
construction of a representation of the situation portrayed in the text. The present article 
cites recent research on inference processing, embodied language comprehension, and 
neuroimaging studies of text comprehension to demonstrate how background knowledge is as 
relevant a source of information as the words in the text themselves. Although these areas of 
research are promising in furthering our understanding of the interaction between background 
knowledge and textual features in the construction of mental representations, there remain 
considerable challenges to research in these domains. In summary, the study of text 
comprehension has broadened our understanding of how people use their background 
knowledge to process texts, and at the same time has raised new questions that merit 
appropriate conceptualizations and suitable methodological approaches to form a clearer 
image of how texts are understood. 
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Footnote 
i Let us not forget, although it is not central here, that such a study also has great 
social implications. In Switzerland and France, for example, job advertisements are still often 
presented in the masculine form, taking for granted that readers will consider it as a generic 
form. As raised by Gygax et al. (2008), this is undoubtedly discriminatory to women. 
